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ABSTRACT. Symbolic logic faced great difficulties in its early stage of development in 
order to acquire recognition of its utility for the needs of science and society. The aim 
of this paper is to discuss an early attempt by the British logician Lewis Carroll (1832–
1898) to promote symbolic logic as a social good. This examination is achieved in three 
phases: first, Carroll’s belief in the social utility of logic, broadly understood, is demon-
strated by his numerous interventions to fight fallacious reasoning in public debates. 
Then, Carroll’s attempts to promote symbolic logic, specifically, are revealed through 
his work on a treatise that would make the subject accessible to a wide and young 
audience. Finally, it is argued that Carroll’s ideal of logic as a common good influenced 
the logical methods he invented and allowed him to tackle more efficiently some prob-
lems that resisted to early symbolic logicians.  
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Introduction 
Early symbolic logicians were not great salesmen. Indeed, they strug-
gled to convince their colleagues of the utility of their methods. Algebraic 
logicians mainly tackled the problem of elimination where a conclusion is 
drawn from an indeterminate number of premises, but admitted that “we 
have seldom occasion to trouble ourselves with problems which would 
introduce” a high number of terms [Venn, 1894, p. 117]. Besides, oppo-
nents to symbolic logic considered these problems to be artificial and triv-
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ial “in comparison with the serious business of logic proper” [Cook Wil-
son, 1926, p. 637]. The Logistic tradition was free from this objection, but 
its early promoters constrained their scope of exploration to mathematical 
reasoning and hardly investigated any social applications. Symbolic logi-
cian Arthur Shearman conceded that “Symbolic Logic cannot directly as-
sist the individual in his scientific pursuits or in his daily affairs”, although 
it could provide valuable ‘indirect’ help [Shearman, 1906, p. 226]. Phi-
losopher F.C.S. Schiller was more severe as he attacked the entire formal 
logic on the grounds of its incapacity to deal with actual thinking. Al-
though he granted that formal logic might be investigated as a scientific 
by-product for mental training, Schiller viewed formal logic as a social 
problem that alienates human thought and social action [Schiller, 1912, pp. 
374–409]. On the contrary, Polish philosopher Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, 
who championed symbolic logic and anti-irrationalism, promoted the 
teaching of logic, which he considered necessary for social progress 
[Ajdukiewicz, 1951, 1955, 1959]. These examples attest to the difficulty 
that symbolic logic faced in its early stage of development in order to ac-
quire recognition of its utility, both for the needs of science and society. 
The aim of this paper is to discuss an early attempt by the British logician 
Lewis Carroll, whose real name was Charles L. Dodgson (1832–1898), to 
promote symbolic logic as a social good. This examination will be 
achieved in three phases: first, Carroll’s belief in the social utility of logic, 
broadly understood, is demonstrated by his numerous interventions to fight 
fallacious reasoning in public debates. Then, Carroll’s attempts to promote 
symbolic logic, specifically, are revealed through his work on a treatise 
that would make the subject accessible to a wide and young audience. Fi-
nally, it will be argued that Carroll’s ideal of logic as a common good in-
fluenced the logical methods he invented and allowed him to tackle more 
efficiently some problems that troubled early symbolic logicians.  
Logic in society 
Although Carroll’s logical writings were published late in his life, his 
interest in logic was old and regular. This attention to logic can be traced 
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throughout his life in his writings, both literary and mathematical, but also 
through his public concerns. Indeed, Carroll believed that “Society would 
be much less liable to panics and other delusions, and political life, espe-
cially, would be a totally different thing, if even a majority of the argu-
ments, that are scattered broadcast over the world, were correct! But it is 
all the other way” [Carroll, 1887, p. 32]. Hence, he often decided himself 
to intervene in public debates that he considered to be damaged by bad 
logic. His biographers record him frequently engaging in disputes and 
writing to periodicals in order to refute claims and arguments that he con-
sidered to be fallacious. These pieces cover a wide range of topics such as 
University issues, politics and election procedures, religious affairs, child-
actors, vivisection and many others. Although logic is broadly understood 
at present, it will be seen further in this paper that this conviction in the 
importance of logic in society led Carroll to work on the popularisation of 
symbolic logic, specifically, as an instrument to clear ideas and prevent 
fallacious reasoning in both science and everyday life.  
Carroll’s promotion of logic in public debates might be illustrated by 
a case that happened in the summer of 1877 when his vacations at East-
bourne coincided with a local debate on the merits of vaccination. The 
story of a local grocer who was prosecuted for neglecting to have his child 
vaccinated opened a dispute in the columns of The Eastbourne Chronicle, 
as to whether children should be vaccinated. Anti-vaccinators supported 
their claims with statistical arguments that Carroll held to be unsatisfac-
tory. Hence, he entered the scene “as a mathematician, not as a doctor” to 
point out the insufficiencies of the statistical arguments that were offered. 
The interesting point for our concern is that Carroll did not necessarily 
engage in the debate to defend one view over the other, but rather inter-
vened to assess the logical value of the arguments and to refute what he 
held to be a fallacy. In his last letter on the topic, he explains how he “did 
not come forward as a champion in the controversy, but as a critic; and 
[he] concerned [himself] rather with the logical accuracy of the weapons 
than with the result of the fight” [Carroll, 1976, pp. 12–13].  
Religious thinking was a specific region where Carroll believed that 
logic plays a significant role. Actually, religion was probably a crucial 
136  AMIROUCHE MOKTEFI 
motivation that made him later work hard on his logic treatise which he 
regarded as a “work for God” [Cohen & Green, 1979, p. 1100; Richards, 
2015]. Carroll was a deacon and, although he never proceeded to priest’s 
orders, he often preached. On several occasions, he warned that the “bad 
logic that occurs in many and many a well-meant sermon, is a real danger 
to modern Christianity” [Collingwood, 1898, p. 301]. Carroll’s belief in the 
utility of logic for religious thinking led him to work on a book about reli-
gious difficulties treated “from a logical point of view, in order to help 
those, who feel such difficulties, to get their ideas clear, and to see what 
are the logical results of the various views held.” [Cohen & Gandolfo, 
1987, p. 319]. Carroll unfortunately never managed to complete this work. 
However, a surviving fragment devoted to the difficulty of ‘Eternal pun-
ishment’ gives an outline of what Carroll had in mind. The difficulty is 
first expressed in the form of distinct incompatible propositions that are 
clearly formulated. Then, Carroll considers for each proposition “what 
would be the logical consequences of abandoning it”. The reader is then 
invited to choose the views that may be held “without violating the inexo-
rable laws of logical reasoning” [Collingwood, 1899, p. 348, 354]. Interest-
ingly, Carroll again does not specify which view he himself held. He justi-
fies his silence by his object that was “throughout, not to indicate one 
course rather than another, but to help the Reader to see clearly what the 
possible courses are, and what he is virtually accepting, or denying, in 
choosing any one of them” [Collingwood, 1899, p. 355]. 
Carroll also publicly defended some of his views, but he was far from 
winning all the battles he engaged in and logic proved not to be the deci-
sive weapon he anticipated. A particular example is of interest for our pur-
pose: in the early 1880s, Carroll attended lawn tennis games and observed 
that tournaments’ procedures involved an important element of chance that 
prevented a fair awarding of prizes among players. Hence, he designed and 
published a “true method for assigning prizes with a proof of the fallacy of 
the present method” [Abeles, 2001, p. 71]. The promotion of his method in 
the St. James Gazette led him to controversy with a correspondent identi-
fied as “Cavendish” on what ought to be a good method of competition in 
tennis tournaments. The interesting point for our purpose is that while 
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Carroll insisted on approaching the subject “mathematically”, his opponent 
retorted that the “real argument is not a mathematical one. It is this: What 
do the players like, and what is it that induces them to enter for matches?” 
[Abeles, 2001, p. 81, 92]. Later on, Carroll admitted that he was powerless 
on this topic since players themselves seemed to deliberately prefer sys-
tems of competition that substituted chance for skill [Abeles, 2001, p. 62]. 
Hence, no matter how fallacious the present method was, its application 
was justified by the will of the players. 
Carroll’s ideal of rigour that he championed in public debates unsur-
prisingly is also essential in his mathematical investigations. His numerous 
writings in this discipline attest a great concern with the precision of nota-
tions and the rigour of arguments. Such is found in his Elementary Treatise 
on Determinants, for instance, where Carroll explains that he had in view 
“to present the subject as a continuous chain of argument, separated from 
all accessories of explanation or illustration, a form which [he] venture[s] 
to think better suited for a treatise on exact science than the semi-colloquial 
semi-logical form often adopted by Mathematical writers” [Carroll, 1867, 
p. iii]. Carroll’s championing of logic can be even more evidently traced in 
his geometrical interests and, particularly, in his defence of Euclid’s Ele-
ments as a textbook for geometrical teaching. Carroll considered that the 
charm of mathematics springs from the “absolute certainty of its results 
[while] Most other Sciences are in a state of constant flux – the precious 
truths of one generation being smiled at as paradoxes by the second gen-
eration, and contemptuously swept away as childish nonsense by the third” 
[Carroll, 1890, p. xv]. This permanence of mathematical truths was of 
great importance within the Victorian ideal of the liberal education that 
was promoted in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. This educa-
tion was not necessarily preparing the individual for a specific profession, 
clergymen excepted. The training rather aimed at forming the minds and 
characters of the students, who are expected to learn correct reasoning and 
good manners. Topics that were viewed as ‘long established’ were fa-
voured as the ingredients of a liberal education, and thus should be mas-
tered first.  
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Among the mathematical sciences, geometry, in its Euclidean form, 
was particularly appreciated for the needs of liberal education as it “really 
consists entirely of manifest examples of perfect reasoning: the reasoning 
being expressed in words which convince the mind, in virtue of the special 
forms and relations to which they directly refer” [Whewell, 1845, p. 29]. 
As such, Euclid was taught as much for the sake of its logic as it was for 
the sake of its geometry, not to mention that it was a classical text. These 
advantages made Euclid’s Elements the principal textbook for the purpose 
of geometrical teaching, with hundreds of editions published in the Victo-
rian period. However, a protest movement started at the end of the 1860s to 
challenge Euclid’s domination and several rival manuals were offered to 
replace Euclid’s. By 1871, an Association for the Improvement of Geomet-
rical Teaching was founded in order to promote reforms in geometrical 
teaching. In the 1880s, this anti-Euclid association published a syllabus and 
a textbook that were submitted to the examination boards of Oxford and 
Cambridge Universities but which did not meet with the success expected. 
Actually, Euclid’s authority was maintained until 1903 when its sequence 
of theorems was eventually dropped from the requirements of examination 
in those universities [Moktefi, 2011]. Carroll actively participated in this 
educational debate among British mathematicians and mathematics teach-
ers on the suitability of Euclid’s book for teaching purposes. In 1879, he 
published a fervent defence of Euclid against his rivals. The book was 
offered as a drama where the main modern textbooks were reviewed and 
compared to Euclid’s work. Carroll expected a good manual of geometry 
to “exercise the learner in habits of clear definite conception, and enable 
him to test the logical value of a scientific argument” [Carroll, 1885, p. 7]. 
In order to assess the modern textbooks, Carroll designed a symbolic 
notation to exhibit the structure of the geometrical demonstrations and 
the logical fallacies that might have been committed. Accordingly, Car-
roll disqualified Euclid’s rivals on the grounds of their logical impreci-
sion. Carroll concluded that Euclid’s work was logically superior and as 
such should be maintained for the purpose of geometrical teaching in 
schools and Colleges. 
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Feeding the mind 
Carroll’s belief in the social utility of logic led him to the idea of writ-
ing a treatise on logic in such a way as for it to be understood by a wide 
audience. While working on this treatise, it occurred to Carroll that he 
could make a game of it. Hence he published in 1886 The Game of Logic, 
a booklet that was accompanied with a board and counters with which 
players would enjoy the pleasure, if any, of solving syllogisms. The pro-
duction of this game beautifully illustrates Carroll’s concern with the pro-
motion of logic. Contrary to his previous scientific works that were signed 
with his real name ‘Charles L. Dodgson’, Carroll signed the booklet (and 
his subsequent logical writings) with his literary pseudonym in order to 
give it further publicity. The game was produced with the same design as 
Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures Under Ground, a facsimile of Carroll’s origi-
nal Alice tale. The two books were scheduled to simultaneously appear at 
Christmas 1886, but Carroll’s dissatisfaction with the printing of his logic 
booklet made him prepare a new edition for the following year [Imholtz, 
2008]. Carroll expected the players of his logic game to get “a little in-
struction as well. But is there any great harm in that, so long as you get 
plenty of amusement?” [Carroll, 1887, preface]. However, in spite of his 
fervent plea and countless efforts, the book did not meet the success that 
Carroll expected. Critics mostly felt uneasy with the book’s mixture of 
amusement and instruction “on the principle that two things, each good in 
itself, often make when mixed a third thing which is neither good nor de-
sirable” [Anonymous, 1887, p. 121]. 
The mixed reception of his logic game did not discourage Carroll from 
promoting logic. Indeed, he devoted in subsequent years a lot of his time to 
teaching logic privately and in Oxford schools [Wakeling, 1978]. He also 
continued working on his popular treatise, which he planned to publish in 
three parts, by level of difficulty. The first volume of Symbolic Logic even-
tually appeared in 1896. Carroll promoted the book and did his best to give 
it a large exposition. He again signed it with his literary pseudonym, wrote 
it in such a way as to be understood by a wide audience, and invented nu-
merous original examples to illustrate it. He pressed his publisher to de-
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crease the price of the book and to increase the size of the word “Elemen-
tary” on the front page. Finally, he printed and spread a pamphlet to pro-
mote the imminent publication of the book. In spite of several interesting 
innovations, Carroll’s logic treatise did not transform the discipline 
[Moktefi, 2008]. This is hardly surprising when we are reminded that its 
author himself labelled it as ‘Elementary’. In his introduction, Carroll 
claimed that he “avoided all difficulties which seemed to [him] to be be-
yond the grasp of an intelligent child of (say) twelve or fourteen years of 
age” [Carroll, 1897, p. xvi]. Carroll was working on the next volumes that 
were expected to tackle more advanced problems, but his death in 1898 
prevented him from completing them. Surviving fragments have been col-
lected, published and praised in 1977 by philosopher William W. Bartley 
III, but they are hardly representative of what Carroll might have eventual-
ly produced [Bartley, 1986].  
What is of interest for our present purpose is that Carroll devoted time 
and effort to making the book accessible to a wide (and young) audience. 
He actually claimed that his treatise was “the very first attempt (with the 
exception of [his] own little book, The Game of Logic, published in 1886, 
a very incomplete performance) that has been made to popularise this fas-
cinating subject” [Carroll, 1897, p. xiv]. This claim for priority might sur-
prise, as it is known that many popular accounts of logic were previously 
published. Carroll himself possessed in his private library at least two such 
works: J. W. Gilbart’s Logic for the Million (1865) and A. Swinbourne’s 
Picture Logic (1875) [Lovett, 2005, p. 129, 301]. The former work aimed 
at explaining the art of Logic “in such a way as to be readily understood 
even by those men and women who have not had the advantage of a liter-
ary education” [Gilbart, 1860, p. v], while the latter work was designed for 
a younger audience [Swinbourne, 1875]. Hence, it is necessary to keep in 
mind that what Carroll was specifically concerned with was the populariza-
tion of symbolic logic in order to understand his priority claim. It is notable 
that Carroll titled a book meant to popularize this “fascinating subject” 
with such an austere title as Symbolic Logic (and was only second to Venn 
in doing so), while he used more colourful titles for his previous popular 
science books: A Tangled Tale (1885) and The Game of Logic (1886). This 
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confirms the importance there was for him to make his work specifically 
stand within the symbolic trend. 
It is difficult to support the notion that Carroll succeeded in populariz-
ing symbolic logic. Although Carroll claimed that he taught the subject to 
“many children” who took “a real intelligent interest in” it [Carroll, 1897, 
pp. xvi–xvii], it is likely that many more children did not share his enthusi-
asm. Carroll’s logic pupils, as is attested by their recollections, all agree 
that it was his great delight to teach them his game of logic, but far from all 
his pupils managed to master it [Cohen, 1989]. The magazine of an Oxford 
school reported in 1887 on a logic examination and stated that “the results 
were not good, considering how much trouble Mr. Dodgson had taken in 
trying to make us understand his lecture” [Abeles, 2010, p. 246]. Although 
Carroll’s methods might have been perceived as difficult by the young to 
whom it was addressed, the complication might lie in the nature of the 
subject itself rather than in the labour of the author. Carroll knew the diffi-
cult challenge he was facing: in the pamphlet advertising the imminent 
publication of his logic book, Carroll warned the readers about “popular 
ideas about Logic […] which have prevented its receiving anything like the 
attention which it deserves” [Abeles, 2010, p. 92]. Then, he addressed 
specifically three such misconceptions which he tries to refute: Logic 
would be difficult, uninteresting and useless. He concedes that the two first 
objections might be urged against formal logic, but not against his symbol-
ic logic, and thus invites the readers to try his methods before making up 
their minds about it. As to the inutility of logic expressed in the third ob-
jection, Carroll fiercely defended the merits of logic, be it formal or sym-
bolic, and argued that the accomplished logician is “the holder of an “Open 
Sesame!” to an inexhaustible treasure-house of varied interests [and] may 
apply his skill to any and every subject of human thought” [Abeles, 2010, 
pp. 91–92]. 
Carroll might look as a white knight naively and hopelessly trying to 
spread good logic around, but it would be unfair and misleading to think 
that his efforts were entirely vain. Confirmed logicians early on admired 
the book for its style and richness and still appeal to it for educational pur-
poses. Logician Hugh MacColl, who reviewed Carroll’s Symbolic Logic in 
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1896, spoke highly of the book’s writing, although he did not adhere to the 
methods it describes. He affirmed that the book was “well arranged, its 
expositions are lucid, it has an excellent stock of examples – many of them 
worked out, and not a few witty and amusing; and its arguments, even 
when wrong, are always acute and well worth weighing” [MacColl, 1896, 
p. 520]. Later on, in a 1905 letter to Bertrand Russell, MacColl recalled 
how he interrupted his logic investigations for about thirteen years until the 
reading of Carroll’s book “rekindled the old fire which [he] thought ex-
tinct” and decided him to reinvest himself in logic [Abeles & Moktefi, 
2011, p. 56]. It must also be reminded that Carroll championed symbolic 
logic at a time when not many logicians did believe in it. Contrary to what 
some historical accounts might suggest, symbolic logic was far from being 
widespread in Carroll’s time. Only a minority of logicians worked in this 
direction, and as such, Carroll’s work contributed by its mere existence, 
and whatever publicity it got, to the promotion of symbolic logic as a new 
trend in logical studies. This was specifically relevant in Oxford where 
Carroll faced the opposition of the Professor of Logic, John Cook Wilson, 
who was a notorious opponent to symbolic logic [Marion, Moktefi, 2014].  
Carroll seems to have taken some pride and enjoyment in this position as 
an outsider within the discipline, and modestly referred to himself as “an 
obscure Writer on Logic” [Carroll, 1897, p. 184]. In contrast, he often re-
ferred to his colleagues as “The Logicians”, hardly spoke of them in any 
positive way and rarely named any in particular. This generic title is said to 
cover “The writers, and editors, of the Logical text-books which run in the 
ordinary grooves” [Carroll, 1897, p. 165]. As such, “The Logicians” were 
mainly the traditional logicians whose textbooks were used for the teaching 
of the subject, unlike symbolic logicians. In a letter to his publisher on 
19 October 1895, Carroll expressed his regret that his treatise could not be 
used in present university examinations as the logic taught there differs. 
However, he had “no doubt that Symbolic Logic (not necessarily [his] par-
ticular method, but some such method) will, some day, supersede Formal 
Logic, as it is immensely superior to it: but there are no signs, as yet, of such 
a revolution” [Cohen & Gandolfo, 1987, p. 323]. Ironically, Carroll’s wish 
for the replacement of old logic by symbolic logic was not shared by John 
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Venn, the leading British symbolic logician of his time. Indeed, Venn made 
high claims for the merits of traditional logic over symbolic logic as an edu-
cational discipline, notably because it kept “its rules and forms of expression 
in tolerably close harmony with the language of ordinary life” [Venn, 1894, 
p. xxvi]. Also, traditional logic “is much more closely connected with the 
practical experiences and needs of ordinary life” [Venn, 1894, p. xxvi]. It is 
Carroll’s greatest merit that he managed to design a symbolic logic that was 
free from Venn’s objections. Indeed, unlike Venn and most symbolic logi-
cians, Carroll worked his logic in conformity with the practices of ordinary 
life. This prominent principle will be evidenced in Carroll’s treatment of the 
existential import of propositions.  
The facts of Logic and the facts of Life 
The problem of existential import was important to symbolic logicians 
because it significantly impacted the symbolic representation of the propo-
sitions they examined and, as such, it affected their suggestiveness and 
workability. Let us consider the three canonical forms of proposition: A 
(“All x are y”), E (“No x is y”) and I (“Some x are y”). We will not address 
propositions of the form “Some x are not y” (generally known as O propo-
sitions) because Carroll systematically changed them into the form “Some 
x are non-y”, and hence, viewed them as a variation of I propositions 
[Englebretsen & Gilday 1976]. There was general agreement as to the exis-
tential import of the E and I propositions: the former were said not to assert 
the existence of their subject, while the latter did. The case of A proposi-
tions is more controversial: traditional logicians tended to consider them as 
asserting the existence of their subject, while modern logicians do not. The 
old usage is evident in the traditional square of opposition where I proposi-
tions are said to be the subalterns of A propositions. This subalternation 
would not hold if A propositions did not have an existential import while I 
propositions did. However, an inconvenience of this doctrine, without 
further specifications, is that it invalidates contraposition. Indeed, while the 
proposition “All x are y” would assert the existence of x, its contraposition 
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yields the proposition “All non-y are non-x”, which merely asserts the exis-
tence of non-x. Saving the contraposition by dropping the existential im-
port of A propositions has its own share of misfortunes: for instance, it 
invalidates the traditionally accepted syllogism Darapti, where a conclu-
sion “Some x are y” is drawn from the premises: “All m are x” and “All m 
are y”. Indeed, the premises of the syllogism would not entail the existence 
of x, while the conclusion does. The symbolic logician who designs a logic 
system has to make a choice as to what to be saved and what to be sacri-
ficed. Venn stated that the symbolic logician has “to repudiate once for all 
any bounden obligation to either the language of common life, or that of 
the common logic” as he is merely concerned with “convenience and con-
sistency in the working out of the Symbolic or Generalized Logic” [Venn, 
1894, p. 145]. Hence, when it comes to the existential import, Venn and 
most symbolic logicians understandably preferred to drop the import of A 
propositions as it makes them easier to represent and to manipulate. 
It must be remembered that early symbolic notations in logic, as de-
signed by George Boole and his immediate followers, appealed to equa-
tions. For instance, the E proposition ‘No x is y’ would be represented by 
the algebraic formula ‘x.y = 0’. This expression asserts that the intersection 
of classes x and y is equal to the empty class (roughly understood). This 
simple idea works smoothly for negative propositions but fails when it 
comes to existential statements. Indeed, Boole and his followers could not 
represent the I proposition ‘Some x is y’ as ‘x.y = 1’ because ‘1’ stands for 
the universal class and the intersection of classes x and y does not neces-
sarily cover it. All we know is that the intersection of x and y yields an 
indeterminate non-empty class that might conventionally be represented as 
v. Hence, one would have to write: ‘x.y = v’. Intriguingly, Venn also failed 
in representing existentials with his diagrams, despite his numerous graph-
ical experiments [Moktefi & Pietarinen, 2015]. Boole and his followers 
were notoriously unhappy with their notations about particular proposi-
tions, and as such almost completely dismissed them from their logical 
works. This failure would have contaminated universal propositions if A 
propositions were held to assert the existence of their subjects. Instead, 
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propositions of the form “All x are y” were simply taken as equivalent to 
“No x is non-y”, and as such, could easily be expressed as: ‘x. (1-y) = 0’. 
Dropping the existential import of A propositions simplifies their represen-
tation and manipulation, and as such, eases the general working of the 
whole logical calculus [Durand-Richard & Moktefi, 2014]. 
It is well-known that “Carroll did not accept [this] doctrine that has 
done so much to simplify traditional formal logic” [Braithwaite, 1932, 
p. 175]. However, it would be misleading to attribute Carroll’s position to 
an obsessive conservatism. An examination of Carroll’s treatment of exis-
tential statements shows that his view rather embraces his ideal of a logic 
that would be truthful to the practical usages of life. Carroll admitted that 
any view on existential import might be conveniently held provided that 
“it is consistent with itself and with the accepted facts of Logic” [Carroll, 
1897, p. 166]. Given that the propositions A, E and I might assert or not 
assert the existence of their subjects, there are eight possible views to be 
considered. Carroll makes first a selection of views that might be conven-
iently held by eliminating those that conflict with the “facts of logic”. Ac-
cordingly, he saved two views that he considered to be logically workable: 
Either (1) I and A propositions assert the existence of their subject while E 
propositions do not, or (2) I does not assert the existence of its subject 
while A and E propositions do. Carroll’s selection, depending on what he 
held to be a fact of logic, might be disputed. However, this will not con-
cern us in the present paper as it is the overall process that is of interest for 
us. Carroll believed that one might conveniently adopt any of the views 
that are permitted by logic.  
While Venn favoured the ease of the logician in the working of his 
logic, Carroll privileged faithfulness to ordinary life practices. Hence, 
among the two views above on existential import that he pre-selected, Car-
roll excluded the second because “when we come to test it, as applied to 
the actual facts of life, we shall find I think, that it fits in with them so 
badly that its adoption would be, to say the least of it, singularly inconven-
ient for ordinary folk” [Carroll, 1897, p. 167]. Hence, Carroll retained the 
first view, making I and A propositions assert the existence of their subject 
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while E propositions do not. He held this view to mirror better than any 
other what he considered to be the facts of Logic and the facts of Life. 
Carroll’s view on existential import is not original since it precisely is the 
view that was held by most traditional logicians in the Aristotelian line. It 
is, however, remarkable that he offered such “a fair rational reconstruction 
of Aristotle’s own views” on existential import and was practically alone 
among symbolic logicians to adopt it [Slater, 1979, p. 39]. 
A happy consequence of Carroll’s position is that it obliges the logi-
cian to seriously tackle the problem of existentials. It has been explained 
earlier how Boole and Venn failed in adequately representing particular 
propositions with symbolic notations. Consequently, their logical treatises 
are mainly devoted to universals, while particulars are dismissed. Venn 
minimized this fact arguing that to exclude particular propositions “from 
our rules would only be a slightly greater encroachment upon the full free-
dom of popular speech than has been already brought about by the exclu-
sion of such terms as ‘many’, ‘most’ and others of a somewhat quantitative 
character. Particular propositions, in their common acceptation, are of [a] 
somewhat temporary and unscientific character. Science seeks for the uni-
versal, and will not be fully satisfied until it has attained it” [Venn, 1894, 
p. 189]. Carroll obviously could not share this view. In a letter to Cook 
Wilson, he justified the importance of particulars by their occurrence in 
ordinary life: “I fear I cannot agree with you in limiting the application of 
Logic to exact Science. In my view, it is of very great use in ordinary life, 
where Particular Conclusions are often the best we can get” [Bartley, 
1986, pp. 376–377]. Carroll clearly approached logic as a discipline with 
applications in ordinary life, not merely as an instrument for scientific 
inquiry. He gave particulars the attention they needed and offered a rather 
effective representation for them. His symbolic notation appealed to sub-
scripts: ‘1’ stands for existence and ‘0’ for non-existence. This makes it 
easy to express propositions: the universal ‘No x is y’ is represented as 
xy0 while the particular ‘Some x are y’ is represented as xy1. The represen-
tation of A propositions is more complex since they stand as double propo-
sitions: ‘All x are y’ is the combination of ‘No x is non-y’ and ‘Some x 
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exists’. Hence, it is represented as x1y´0 (where y´ stands for non-y) [Car-
roll, 1897; Moktefi, 2008]. It might be added that, unlike Venn, Carroll 
also distinctly represented existential statements with diagrammatic nota-
tions [Moktefi and Pietarinen, 2015]. The originality of Carroll’s notations 
for the representation of particular propositions was acknowledged by his 
contemporaries [Sidgwick, 1887; MacColl, 1886].  
Conclusion 
It has been argued that Carroll did not adopt the “doctrine that has 
done so much to simplify traditional formal logic”. This paper shows that it 
was Carroll’s conviction in the social utility of symbolic logic that made 
him avoid that doctrine. Contrary to Venn who favoured convenience, 
Carroll privileged truthfulness to the usages of “common life”, and as such 
developed a logic that he held to be a public good in the sense that it could 
be used for everyday life arguments and debates, and notably in religious 
thinking. In a way, it was Carroll’s resolution to make a “human logic” that 
made him view it as a “work for God”. This resolution certainly compli-
cated his logic notations and methods, but this resistance was not without 
advantages as it made him effectively tackle particular propositions. In 
doing so, he designed an interesting and rather workable symbolic varia-
tion of traditional logic. From this perspective, his symbolic logic might be 
understood as a traditional logic which is worked out with symbols. Car-
roll, who dedicated his treatise to the memory of Aristotle, simply appealed 
to symbols in order to simplify the working of his logic. He complained 
that some formal logic textbooks “might almost have been composed with 
the benevolent intention of furnishing […] the hardest work that could be 
devised – giving the maximum of fatigue with the minimum of result” 
[Abeles, 2010, p. 92]. As such, Carroll did not consider symbolic logic to 
be inherently more useful than formal logic, but it was much simpler, and 
he moreover made it more interesting.  
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